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Privacy Rights Left Behind at the Border: The
Exhaustive, Exploratory Searches Effectuated in
United States v. Cotterman
I. INTRODUCTION
Advances in computer technology have allowed more
information to be stored digitally and have permitted a greater
number of people to own a personal computer. Additionally, legal
professionals increasingly use digital information as sources for
evidence in criminal cases.1 The use of computers presents new
questions and problems for traditional Fourth Amendment searchand-seizure doctrines.2 For example, does the information storagecapacity of computers, and the highly personal information stored
therein heighten personal privacy interests in computers above those
in traditional documents? Additionally, should the government be
limited in its electronic searches of personal computers or in its
ability to recover deleted or discarded information on a personal
computer? Courts confronted with cases regarding searches and
seizures of computers need to adequately recognize and carefully
analyze the new and unique characteristics of computers, or else the
courts will fail to respect the proper balance between individual
citizens’ privacy interests and the government’s interests in enforcing
the law.
In United States v. Cotterman,3 the Ninth Circuit failed to
recognize a proper balance of Fourth Amendment interests and erred
in holding that a border search of a laptop in a forensic computer
laboratory is constitutional absent reasonable suspicion.4 The court
failed to adequately weigh individual privacy interests against the
government’s interests in performing its Fourth Amendment
reasonableness evaluation. The court also failed to recognize that a
forensic search of a computer is particularly offensive. The Ninth
Circuit should have recognized the distinct privacy interests that are
1.
(2005).
2.
3.
4.

Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 532
Id. at 533.
637 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1070.
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violated by a forensic computer examination and should have
required reasonable suspicion.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT RESTRICTION ON SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES AND THE BORDER SEARCH DOCTRINE
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable
searches and seizures.5 Generally, a search or seizure is unreasonable
unless government agents have probable cause that a crime has been,
or is being, committed.6 However, many exceptions to the general
rule exist. For example, some searches require only reasonable
suspicion of the commission of a crime,7 which is a lower standard of
proof than probable cause.8 Other searches require no suspicion at
all.9
The exception to the probable-cause requirement pertinent to
Cotterman is the border-search doctrine. Two Supreme Court cases
and one Ninth Circuit case have developed the border-search
doctrine regarding searches of computers and whether reasonable
suspicion is required. This Note discusses the basics of the bordersearch doctrine and these cases below.
To begin, the premise of the border-search doctrine is that
“searches made at the border, pursuant to the long-standing right of
the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons

5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6. JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES (2010). “Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and
circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that an offense has been or is being committed.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
175–76 (1949) (second alteration in original) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 162 (1925)).
7. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that reasonable suspicion is sufficient
to justify a temporary investigatory detention and a quick search for weapons). Reasonable
suspicion exists when a law enforcement officer has “specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion” caused
by the search or seizure. Id. at 21.
8. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less
demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be
established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to
establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from
information that is less reliable . . . .”).
9. For example, searches based on the searched party’s consent do not require any level
of suspicion. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
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and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by
virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.”10 The rationale for
the doctrine is that border searches and seizures “are justified by the
national interests of the sovereign state in preventing the entry of
undesirable persons and prohibited goods.”11 Additionally,
individuals have a lower expectation of privacy at the border because
a reasonable person understands that she is subject to customs
inspections when entering a country.12 While the Constitution
permits routine border searches and seizures without any
particularized suspicion, some nonroutine searches and seizures at
the border require reasonable suspicion.13
A. Reasonable Suspicion at the Border: Montoya de Hernandez
In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, the Supreme Court
held that reasonable suspicion justified detention—or temporary
seizure—of a traveler “beyond the scope of a routine customs search
and inspection,” in which the traveler was suspected of alimentarycanal smuggling.14 The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
determination that a standard of proof higher than reasonable
suspicion was required for a nonroutine border detention.15 Rather,
the Court concluded that reasonable suspicion was sufficient to
detain a traveler based on a traditional reasonableness analysis. The
Court’s reasonableness analysis weighed the government’s increased
interest in protecting its borders from illegal drugs—particularly in
light of the increase in (and difficulty of detecting) alimentary-canal
smuggling16—against the defendant’s reduced privacy interests.17

10. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977). See id. at 616–20 for further
discussion.
11. Sara M. Smyth, Searches of Computers and Computer Data at the United States
Border: The Need for a New Framework Following United States v. Arnold, 2009 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL’Y 69, 73 (2009).
12. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539 (1985); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
13. See Smyth, supra note 11, at 73; Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538. The
Supreme Court has not defined what makes a search “routine” or “nonroutine.”
14. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541. Alimentary-canal smuggling occurs when a
person tries to transport drugs by swallowing balloons filled with drugs. Id. at 534.
15. Id. at 540.
16. Id. at 538–39.
17. Id. at 539–40 (“Balanced against the sovereign’s interests at the border are the
Fourth Amendment rights of respondent.”).
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While the Court in Montoya de Hernandez established that
reasonable suspicion was sufficient for a nonroutine, temporary
seizure of a person,18 it explicitly refrained from holding what level of
suspicion, if any, would be required for a nonroutine search.19
B. No Suspicion Necessary for a Search of a Vehicle: Flores-Montano
The Supreme Court addressed whether reasonable suspicion was
required for a vehicle search at the border in United States v. FloresMontano.20 In Flores-Montano, the Supreme Court held that no
suspicion was necessary for the government “to remove, disassemble,
and reassemble a vehicle’s fuel tank” at the border.21 The Ninth
Circuit had previously held that a nonroutine search required
reasonable suspicion based on language from Montoya de Hernandez,
and therefore the Court reasoned that a fuel tank search qualified for
reasonable-suspicion classification.22 However, the Supreme Court
rejected the Ninth Circuit rule and reliance on classification of
searches as nonroutine because “the reasons that might support a
requirement of some level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive
searches of the person—dignity and privacy interests of the person
being searched—simply do not carry over to vehicles.”23
The Court then engaged in a traditional reasonableness analysis.
It emphasized the government’s interest in preventing drug
smuggling in gas tanks,24 and weighed those interests against the
privacy interests in a vehicle. The Court reasoned that a person’s
expectation of privacy is lower in her gas tank than in the passenger
compartment of a car; and since a person at the border cannot expect
privacy in the passenger compartment of her car, she cannot expect
privacy in her gas tank.25 Finally, the Court reasoned that the search
18. As mentioned in footnote 13, the Supreme Court did not define what makes a
search or seizure “routine.” However, the seizure in Montoya de Hernandez is an example of
what the Court considered “nonroutine.” In Montoya de Hernandez, customs officials detained
the defendant in the customs office for sixteen hours while waiting for the traveler to defecate.
Id. at 535.
19. Id. at 541 n.4.
20. 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
21. Id. at 155.
22. See id. at 152.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 153–54. In the five-and-one-half fiscal years leading up to the case, 4,619
vehicles had been seized because of drugs hidden in the gas tank. Id. at 153.
25. See id. at 154.
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was not “particularly offensive,” and thus did not violate legitimate
privacy rights.26 Following this analysis, the Court held that the
search was reasonable, even without reasonable suspicion.
In Flores-Montano, the Court “[left] open the question whether,
and under what circumstances, a border search [without reasonable
suspicion] might be deemed unreasonable because of the particularly
offensive manner in which it is carried out.”27 However, the Court
indicated that reasonable suspicion may be required where the search
or seizure is “highly intrusive,” and it implicates the “dignity and
privacy interests of the person being searched.”28 Additionally, the
cases that the Court cites in support of finding unreasonableness
based on the “particularly offensive manner” of a search29 are
Kremen v. United States30 and Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States.31 The searches in those cases were particularly offensive
because they were “exhaustive,” “general exploratory search[es].”32
In short, Montoya de Hernandez and Flores-Montano offered few
bright-line rules to follow when determining whether reasonable
suspicion is necessary for a border search or seizure. Rather than rely
on categories such as “routine”33 or “intrusive,”34 the Supreme
Court instead engaged in a traditional Fourth Amendment
reasonableness test in which it weighed heightened government
interests against an individual’s lessened expectation of privacy at the
border.35 To require reasonable suspicion, individual privacy interests
must be exceptionally high because the “balance between the
interests of the Government and the privacy right of the individual
is . . . struck much more favorably to the Government at the

26. Id. at 154 n.2.
27. Id. (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 n.13 (1977) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
28. Id. at 152.
29. Id. at 154 n.2 (citing Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 n.13).
30. 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
31. 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
32. United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068, 1086 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting).
33. Id. at 1080 (majority opinion).
34. Id.
35. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154 (2004); United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539–40 (1985) (“Balanced against the sovereign’s
interests at the border are the Fourth Amendment rights of respondent.”).
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border.”36 Finally, the search may be unreasonable—absent
reasonable suspicion—if the search is exhaustive and exploratory.
C. No Reasonable Suspicion for Basic Computer Searches: Arnold
In United States v. Arnold, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether
searching a laptop at the border is reasonable. The court held that
searching the digital information of a laptop was reasonable without
reasonable suspicion37 where the search consisted of the border agent
clicking through some files on the laptop’s desktop in the presence
of the defendant.38 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the manner of
the search was not particularly offensive because the court compared
the laptop to a luggage-like container (notwithstanding the storage
capacity of computers), which can be searched without suspicion at
the border.39
III. COTTERMAN FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 6, 2007, Howard Cotterman and his wife, Maureen,
drove from Mexico to the port of entry in Lukeville, Arizona and
presented themselves for admission into the United States with their
United States passports.40 The Customs and Border Protection
(“CBP”) officer, following standard procedure, checked the
passports against the CBP electronic database and found an alert on
Cotterman’s passport.41 The alert42 notified the CBP officer that
Cotterman had been convicted of “two counts of use of a minor in
sexual conduct, two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct upon a
child, and three counts of child molestation.”43 The alert further
advised the officer to be on the “lookout” for child pornography in
Cotterman’s possession.44

36. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540.
37. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008).
38. Id. at 1005.
39. Id. at 1009–10.
40. United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2011).
41. Id. at 1071.
42. The alert “was part of Operation Angel Watch, which combats child sex tourism by
flagging sex offenders who target children and frequently travel outside the United States.” Id.
at 1071 n.2.
43. Id. at 1071.
44. Id.
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Due to the alert, the CBP officer detained the Cottermans for a
more thorough search and contacted Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”).45 ICE agents instructed the border agents to
check anything the Cottermans might have that could contain child
pornography.46 CBP officers checked Cotterman’s vehicle and found
two laptops, one belonging to Cotterman and one belonging to
Maureen, and three digital cameras.47 After checking the cameras and
the laptops, the officers found no child pornography.48 However, the
officers could not access several password-protected files on
Cotterman’s laptop.49
Soon thereafter, two ICE agents arrived at the Lukeville Port of
Entry to assist in the search.50 These agents interviewed Cotterman,
who offered to help the agents gain access to the password-protected
files in his computer.51 However, the agents refused his help because
they were concerned that if Cotterman had access to his computer,
he would be able to delete or hide some of the files without them
knowing.52 The ICE agents instead decided to confiscate the two
laptops and one of the cameras for a forensic examination.53 After the
interview, the ICE agents released the Cottermans and took the
laptops and camera to the ICE office in Tucson, Arizona for the
forensic examination.54
The next day, the ICE forensic examiner made copies of the
computers’ hard drives and of the camera’s memory card.55 The
forensic examiner, Agent John Owen, found nothing when he
examined the camera memory card and released it that same day.56
Agent Owen then left his examination scripts running overnight to
analyze the computer hard drives.57

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1071–72.
Id. at 1072.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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On Sunday morning, Agent Owen began examining the laptop
hard drives.58 He found nothing on Maureen’s laptop, but he found
seventy-five images of child pornography in the unallocated space59
of Cotterman’s laptop.60 Agent Owen tried to contact Cotterman
but learned after two days that Cotterman had fled to Sydney,
Australia.61 Agent Owen then continued to search Cotterman’s
laptop, and he soon found 378 images of child pornography.62 Many
of the images depicted Cotterman sexually molesting a child.63 Over
the next few months, Agent Owen discovered hundreds more
pornographic images, videos, and stories depicting children.64
On June 27, 2009, the United States charged Cotterman in
connection with the images found on his laptop.65 After Cotterman
was extradited from Australia, he moved to suppress the evidence
found on his laptop.66 The district-court judge granted Cotterman’s
motion,67 and the United States appealed.68
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN COTTERMAN
In Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit began its analysis by
determining that the search and seizure of Cotterman’s laptops fell
under the border-search doctrine.69 The court then identified three
categories of inappropriate borders searches: “highly intrusive
searches of a person,” searches that destroy property, and searches
performed in a “particularly offensive manner.”70
58. Id.
59. “Unallocated space is space on the hard drive where a computer stores digital
information that has been erased by the computer user or information from web sites the
computer has visited.” Id. at 1072 n.5.
60. Id. at 1072.
61. Id. at 1072–73.
62. Id. at 1073.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Cotterman was charged with “production of child pornography, transportation and
shipping of child pornography, receipt of child pornography, possession of child pornography,
importation of obscene material, transportation of obscene material, and unlawful flight to
avoid prosecution.” Id.
66. He moved to suppress on April 18, 2008. Id.
67. The district judge granted the motion and made some factual findings on February
23, 2009. Id.
68. The government appealed on March 19, 2009. Id.
69. Id. at 1074–79.
70. Id. at 1079–80.
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The court quickly dismissed the first two categories and focused
its analysis on the last, whether ICE performed the search in a
“particularly offensive manner.”71 To determine whether the search
was particularly offensive, the court addressed Cotterman’s two
arguments.72
First, Cotterman argued that the search was offensive because it
was unnecessary to take the laptop to Tucson for a forensic search
since he had offered to help the ICE agents gain access to the
password-protected files.73 The court rejected this argument because
it determined that the ICE agents’ concerns about Cotterman hiding
or deleting the files were reasonable.74 The court further doubted
Cotterman’s true willingness to help, given the fact that he fled the
country to avoid prosecution.75
Cotterman’s second argument was that the duration of the
seizure—two days—made it particularly offensive.76 The court
analyzed this argument by considering the steps that the ICE agents
took to perform their search. It concluded that the length of time
that the agents had held Cotterman’s laptop was reasonable because
of the intensive nature of a computer-forensics search and because of
Agent Owen’s “reasonable diligence and speed in conducting the
computer forensic examination.”77
Overall, by concluding that the search was not particularly
offensive, and in making no finding regarding the presence of
reasonable suspicion,78 the court implicitly held that reasonable
suspicion was not necessary for the search to actually be reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the court reversed the trial
court’s decision and denied Cotterman’s motion.79

71. Id. at 1079–83.
72. Id. at 1080.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1080–81.
76. Id. at 1082.
77. Id. at 1083 (internal quotation marks omitted). Agent Owen went so far as to work
through both Saturday and Sunday. See supra Part III.
78. Id. at 1074.
79. Id. at 1084.
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V. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit erred in its analysis of the search in Cotterman
and in its final holding that reasonable suspicion was not necessary.
The Ninth Circuit should have engaged in a more-thorough
reasonableness analysis, including the weighing of government and
individual interests. Further, as part of its reasonableness analysis, the
Ninth Circuit should have determined that the search in Cotterman
was exhaustive and exploratory and therefore should have held that
the search was “particularly offensive.” In so doing, the court should
have found that reasonable suspicion was necessary to forensically
search Cotterman’s computer.
The court erred because it identified three categories of
inappropriate border searches80 and created a rule that border
searches are not inappropriate unless they fit within one of those
three categories. The Ninth Circuit specifically based most of its
opinion on the “particularly offensive” category. In following its
categorical rule, the Ninth Circuit failed to perform a thorough
Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis.
The Ninth Circuit’s approach was inadequate because proper
Fourth Amendment analysis does not rely on “[c]omplex balancing
tests” focused on different categories of searches.81 Rather, “[t]he
permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by
‘balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.’”82
While the Ninth Circuit discussed the government’s general
interest in performing searches and seizures at the border,83 it
insufficiently evaluated the government’s particular interest in
excluding child pornography and decreasing child sex abuse. The
Ninth Circuit also insufficiently addressed an individual’s privacy

80. The three categories were (1) “highly intrusive searches of a person,” (2) searches
that destroy property, and (3) searches performed in a “particularly offensive manner.” Id. at
1079–80.
81. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).
82. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (quoting
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).
83. Cotterman, 637 F.3d at 1074–79.
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interests in his laptop. Furthermore, while analysis to determine
whether the search was performed in a “particularly offensive
manner” may be an important part of a reasonableness analysis, the
Ninth Circuit failed to recognize that what makes a search
“particularly offensive” is its exhaustive and exploratory nature, like
the searches in Kremen and Go-Bart Importing.84
If the court had performed its analysis appropriately, it would
have concluded that a reasonable-suspicion standard is necessary to
conduct forensic computer searches at the border; an individual’s
privacy rights and the offensive, exhaustive nature of such searches
outweigh the compelling government interest.
A. Government Interest in Excluding Child Pornography
Although the Cotterman court discussed the government’s
general interest in protecting its borders and excluding contraband,85
the court should have discussed the government’s particular interest
in searching computers to discover contraband implicating child-sex
crimes.86 Because privacy interests in a personal laptop should
outweigh the government’s general interest in border security, the
Ninth Circuit would have been better able to weigh the strong
government interest in these types of searches if it had considered
the true government interest of protecting against the sexual
exploitation of children.
The government has a strong interest in preventing human
trafficking in sex, both because of the growing problem of human
trafficking and because of the vulnerability of its victims.87 To
illustrate, the International Labor Office estimated that in the year
2000, approximately 1.8 million children worldwide were being
exploited for prostitution and pornography worldwide.88 In response
84. See supra Part II.B.
85. See supra Part II.B.
86. Contraband found in computers may include child pornography as well as terrorist
plans. Erick Lucadamo, Reading Your Mind at the Border: Searching Memorialized Thoughts
and Memories on Your Laptop and United States v. Arnold, 54 VILL. L. REV. 541, 574 (2009)
(citations omitted).
87. Hillary Clinton, Letter from Secretary, in 2011 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 1,
available at http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164217.htm (“[T]he United
States and the international community have made the solemn commitment to fight this
scourge wherever it exists.”).
88. INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, FACTS ON COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION
CHILDREN
1
(2003),
available
at
http://www.wotclef.org/documents/
OF
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to this growing problem, Congress has passed laws criminalizing
child-sex tourism89 and possession and distribution of child
pornography90 to diminish the demand for commercial-sexualexploitation of children.91 In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court
itself recognized that the reasons for prohibiting possession and
distribution of child pornography are compelling.92 Because the
government has a compelling interest in prohibiting possession and
distribution of child pornography, the government has a compelling
interest in excluding child pornography from admittance into the
United States. Thus, the government has an interest in searching
computers to discover child pornography as computers enter the
country.
B. Individual’s Expectation of Privacy in Laptops
Additionally, the Cotterman court failed to adequately address an
individual’s privacy interests in his laptop.93 In addressing individual
privacy interests, the Ninth Circuit merely cited Arnold and failed to
adequately discuss the unusually high privacy interest that individuals
maintain in their computers.
A quick discussion of computer characteristics and use reveals
why individual privacy interests in computers are so high. Computers
are distinctly different from traditional “papers and effects” protected
by the Fourth Amendment.94 For example, computers made in 2005
have storage capacities equivalent to about forty-million pages of
text.95 Because of such vast storage capability, computers hold almost
infinite personal information and “should not be grouped with . . .
wallets, purses, luggage, and other simple containers.”96

fs_sexualexploit_0303.pdf.
89. Child-sex tourism occurs when a person travels to a foreign country for the purpose
of engaging in sex with a child. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT SHEET:
OPERATION PREDATOR—TARGETING CHILD EXPLOITATION AND SEXUAL CRIMES (Nov. 19,
2008), http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/predator.htm.
90. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2006).
91. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PREVENTION: FIGHTING SEX TRAFFICKING BY CURBING
DEMAND FOR PROSTITUTION (June 27, 2011), http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/fs/2011/
167224.htm.
92. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–64 (1982).
93. See supra Part IV.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
95. Kerr, supra note 1, at 542.
96. Bret E. Rasner, Comment, International Travelers Beware: No Reasonable Suspicion
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Searches of computers reveal far more personal information than
traditional paper files. From a computer search, the government
could find out what websites a person has visited and read, who the
person associates with, when the person is active on the internet, and
a host of other very personalized, detailed information.
Because of computers’ unique characteristics, many courts and
scholars have recognized the need for a “special approach” when
analyzing searches and seizures of computers in general.97 Thus,
because of computers’ unique capacity to store information, an
individual’s privacy interests invoked by a forensic search should be
distinguished from other cases that reject a reasonable expectation of
privacy; the court should hold that a forensic search implicates the
“dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched.”98
For example, the traditional lack of expectation of privacy in a
vehicle,99 as discussed in Flores-Montano,100 is clearly distinguishable
from the expectation of privacy in computers. Because of the massive
amount of intimate information computers store, searches of
computers threaten “dignity and privacy interests”101 more than
searches of cars.
Notwithstanding such a high expectation of privacy in a
computer, Arnold recognized that “a search which occurs in an
otherwise ordinary manner, is . . . [not unreasonable] simply due to
the storage capacity of the object being searched.”102 Therefore, even
the particularly high privacy interests in a laptop are not, by
themselves, sufficient to make unreasonable a border search of a
computer. However, a search that does not occur in an ordinary
manner, but that is particularly offensive, would tip the scale towards
finding an unreasonable search.

Needed to Search Your Electronic Storage Devices at the Border, 3 PHX. L. REV. 669, 697
(2010); see also S. 3612, 110th Cong. § 2(4) (2008).
97. Kerr, supra note 1, at 572; Smyth, supra note 11, at 71 (citing United States v.
Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir.
1982)); Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 75, 104 (1994)).
98. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).
99. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390–92 (1985) (discussing the decreased
expectation of privacy in a vehicle because of the automobile exception).
100. See supra Part II.B.
101. See id.
102. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2008).
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C. Particularly Offensive Manner of Forensic Searches
The Ninth Circuit failed to perform a thorough reasonableness
analysis because it merely likened the search in Cotterman to the
manual computer search in Arnold, notwithstanding the significant
differences between the two searches. These two searches are
significantly different under a reasonableness analysis because both
the process and the fruits of a forensic computer search are
significantly different from those of a traditional search of documents
or containers.103
A manual computer search, like that in Arnold, is similar to a
traditional search of documents and containers, such as searching
through stacks of papers contained in luggage or in a briefcase. Such
a search is significantly limited by a law-enforcement officer’s time
and ability to read everything on site. In contrast, a forensic
computer search involves copying a hard drive and running scripts to
evaluate the information on the hard drive.104 The duration of a
forensics examination will last as long “as the analyst has to give
it.”105 With a forensics search, the government could
translate any documents in a foreign language, ensure that none of
the seemingly innocuous pictures are actually encrypted messages,
verify the licenses on any music or movies on the computer, review
financial logs for evidence of insider trading, read email
correspondence to ensure that there is no communication with
known criminals—the list of possible [governmental] “concerns” is
endless.106

Thus, forensic searches would be similar to the government
making copies of every sheet in a stack of papers and having no
restrictions whatsoever on the time and resources used to read
through and analyze every detail found in the papers. Furthermore,
as discussed in Part V.B, computers have the capacity to reveal far

103. See Kerr, supra note 1, at 538.
104. United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2011).
105. Kerr, supra note 1, at 544.
106. Cotterman, 637 F.3d at 1086 n.5 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION DIRECTIVE No. 3340-049 (August 20, 2009) (“Searches of
electronic devices help detect evidence relating to terrorism and other national security
matters, human and bulk cash smuggling, contraband, and child pornography. They can also
reveal information about financial and commercial crimes, such as those relating to copyright,
trademark and export control violations.”)).
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more information than most physical documents or containers. Such
a search would be exhaustive, exploratory, and therefore, particularly
offensive.
Overall, because of the exhaustive nature of forensic searches, the
search in Cotterman should be distinguished from that in Arnold.
The search in Arnold consisted of an agent looking at files on the
computer in the presence of the defendant.107 In contrast, the
Cotterman search consisted of agents making copies of the hard
drives and subjecting them to programming scripts that ran for
hours.108 A forensic search is far more capable of revealing vast
amounts of highly personal information than the mere opening of a
container or browsing of files by a human-being. Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit should have concluded that the forensic search of
Cotterman’s computer was particularly offensive.
Although the government interest in safeguarding against child
sex trafficking and child pornography is compelling, the reasonably
high expectation of privacy in a computer and the exhaustive and
offensive nature of a forensics search weigh in favor of requiring
reasonable suspicion for forensic searches. The Cotterman decision
permits a border agent to perform a forensics search on any
computer entering the country without any sort of suspicion.
Following Cotterman, no Fourth Amendment barrier prevents the
government from forensically examining every computer entering the
country to verify that its owner is not engaged in criminal activity of
any type. Such searches would be “exhaustive,” “general exploratory
search[es]”109 and would violate the Fourth Amendment’s protection
of individual privacy. These exhaustive searches will likely affect many
more individuals, particularly considering the high rate of
international travel110 and the increasing ownership of laptops. Thus,
to protect an individual’s right to privacy and to avoid unreasonable,
exhaustive searches, a reasonable-suspicion standard should be
required to perform a computer forensics examination under the
border-search doctrine.

107. See supra Part II.C.
108. See supra Part III.
109. See supra Part II.B.
110. On an average day, CBP processes 965,167 people entering the country. CBP, ON
A TYPICAL DAY IN FISCAL YEAR 2010 (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/
cgov/about/accomplish/previous_year/fy10_stats/typical_day_fy2010.xml.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit erred in Cotterman by holding that a border
search of a laptop in a forensic computer laboratory is constitutional,
absent reasonable suspicion. The court’s analysis lacked the necessary
depth, particularly regarding Cotterman’s privacy expectations in his
laptop. The Ninth Circuit should have concluded that the search of
Cotterman’s laptop was particularly offensive to privacy interests and
was reasonable without a showing of reasonable suspicion. After the
Ninth Circuit’s holding, the government is free to perform extensive
searches on any laptop entering the country for any reason, thus
allowing the government access to practically infinite amounts of
“information that is highly personal, confidential or even
proprietary.”111
Aaron McKnight*

111. Smyth, supra note 11, at 71.
 J.D. candidate, April 2013, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University.
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